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In December 1991 Mikhail Gorba-
chev resigned, the hammer and sickle was 
lowered for the last time over Moscow, and 
the USSR was dissolved. For the first time 
in four decades America and Russia 
breathed a sigh of relief—the Cold War was 
over. Apparently though, Presidents George 
W. Bush and Vladimir Putin never got the 
memo. 
Russian/U.S. relations have declined 
during the past two years, to the point that 
some scholars, such as Ariel Cohen, have 
labeled the current situation a “cool war.”1 
Both leaders predictably point the finger at 
the other for this “cooling.” In truth, both 
leaders are to blame. 
The Bush Administration’s dogged 
insistence on the European Missile Shield, a 
costly program of marginal operational abil-
ity and marginal necessity, provokes Russia, 
and is reminiscent of the Cold War mindset. 
Putin frequently voices his displeasure with 
this proposed shield, but when he states 
that, “[It is] too early to speak of an end to 
the arms race”2 as he did in a 2006 speech, 
his rhetoric sounds like he lifted it from the 
old Soviet playbook. 
In addition to the rhetoric, Russia’s 
recent actions too often mirror that of the 
Soviet era. Putin portrays Russia as a facili-
tator of peace, a leader of the global commu-
nity, and a promoter of human rights and 
democracy. This is a difficult pill to swallow. 
This is, after all, the same “democratic” Rus-
sia that recently turned off gas and oil sup-
plies to Estonia, Ukraine, and Belarus; fo-
mented unrest in Georgia; violently crushed 
its Chechen population; threatened to aim 
its nuclear missiles at points from Paris to 
Kiev; and has begun probing NATO defenses 
with its long-range bombers. Compared with 
the Soviet era, this may be a kinder, gentler 
Russian bear, but it is a bear nonetheless—a 
fact U.S. policymakers should not forget. 
 Although American officials publicly 
deny that they are implementing the Euro-
pean Missile Shield with Russia in mind, the 
proposed shield is to some extent, it seems, a 
response to Russia’s recent actions. In truth, 
the shield is only the newest wrinkle in a 
long line of disagreements between the two 
countries regarding eastward NATO expan-
sion. 
Russia, per its most recent National 
Security Concept, views both eastward ex-
pansion of NATO and the positioning of mili-
tary contingents near its borders as a threat. 
According to Russia’s views, NATO expan-
sion is not, as the West claims, the means to 
promoting values of stability, personal lib-
erty, democracy, and peace. It is instead an 
explicit attempt to weaken Russia and 
threaten its security. After all, NATO by its 
very nature is a collective defense alliance. 
To mask it as something else is an affront to 
Russia’s intelligence, or so Russia avers. 
Moscow can decry NATO expansion 
all it likes, but it has no legitimate right to 
prevent it. The Warsaw Pact is long dead, 
and sovereign countries are entitled to peti-
tion for entrance into NATO and the security 
it provides. Russia can, however, argue 
against NATO establishing military installa-
tions in new NATO member states. In 1997, 
the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations” 
stipulated that NATO would not station per-
manent and substantial combat forces in new 
member states. Furthermore, NATO secu-
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the time of attack, the type of attacking mis-
sile, its trajectory and intended target, and 
the makeup of its payload. This is not infor-
mation an enemy would conveniently dis-
close. The Pentagon’s Office of the Director 
of Operational Test and Evaluation released 
a statement in January 2006, which cau-
tioned that the “flight tests still lack opera-
tional realism.”8 
The other problem facing the missile 
shield is that enemies can deploy counter-
decoys to fool the missile shield. The sim-
plest way to foil the shield is to overwhelm it 
by firing more missiles than the defense can 
intercept. The enemy could also deploy rep-
lica decoys, disguise the warhead among de-
bris from the exploded booster rocket, jam 
the signaling radar, and more. 
 The Patriot Ground Based System is 
the one missile defense system that has 
worked, albeit not always to perfection. De-
signed to protect U.S. troops from Iraqi 
Scuds, the Patriot Defense System got off to 
an ignominious start in the Persian Gulf 
War. It failed in most or all of its Scud en-
gagements even though the enemy employed 
no obvious counter-measures. In Desert 
Storm, the U.S. Army fired 158 Patriot mis-
siles at 47 Scud missiles but “hit no more 
than four, and possibly hit none.”9 It per-
formed significantly better in 2003’s Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom, intercepting all enemy 
missiles within range. Unfortunately, it also 
intercepted a British RAF Tornado, a Navy 
F-18, and an Airforce F-16, killing three pi-
lots. 
 Even if the missile shield worked 
properly the United States and NATO have 
not presented a convincing argument as to 
why it is necessary. U.S. officials insist the 
shield is intended to protect American inter-
ests and allies from rogue states, and even 
then, could only prevent a limited attack of 
one or two “unsophisticated” missiles. The 
European missile shield could not defend the 
continent against a large-scale attack like 
the one Russia could launch—a point U.S. 
officials willingly concede. NATO Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is of like 
mind: "Ten interceptors cannot and will not 
rity arrangements would not infringe upon 
the sovereign rights of other states and shall 
take into account their legitimate security 
concerns.3  
 Moscow alleges that the United 
States’ attempt to place a missile defense 
shield in Poland as well as a complimentary 
radar base in the Czech Republic is a breach 
of this contract. The United States counters 
with the semantic argument that one missile 
defense shield, although permanent, is 
hardly substantial, nor does this shield con-
stitute a legitimate security concern for Rus-
sia as it is too small to undermine Russia’s 
ballistic missile capabilities.  
In 2007, Putin remarked, “If a new 
missile defense system will be deployed in 
Europe, then we need to warn you today that 
we will come with a response.”4 Putin later 
threatened to aim the Russian nuclear arse-
nal towards European targets. The United 
States, never one to be bullied, pushed for-
ward and inked an “agreement in principle” 
with Poland to place the shield in Polish ter-
ritory. Russia, never one to limit its displeas-
ure to the rhetoric realm, buzzed a U.S. air-
craft carrier in response—twice. 
Not only does this shield have delete-
rious effects on Russian-American relations, 
but the U.S. Congress has also criticized it 
for its sizeable price tag of $76-$110 billion 
and inconsistent results.5 
 The Missile Defense Agency’s Ground 
Based Missile Defense (GMD) tests have 
yielded mixed results. The theory behind 
this defense is that an incoming enemy mis-
sile will hit the interceptor missile’s “kill ve-
hicle” and explode upon impact. Tests so far 
have raised doubts about the effectiveness of 
this method—almost as many missiles get 
past the kill vehicle as collide with it. As of 
May 2007, only five out of nine tests were a 
success.6 Defense experts often remark that 
this type of defense is like "hitting a bullet 
with a bullet."7 
Furthermore, critics argue that these 
tests are attempting to hit a bullet with a 
bullet under ideal and controlled—and 
therefore optimum—circumstances. Tests 
are conducted with the “defender” knowing 
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affect the strategic balance and 10 intercep-
tors can also not pose a threat to Russia.”10  
These statements have done little to 
assuage Moscow’s fears. Russia is confident 
that it could overwhelm one shield right 
now. It is, however, worried that one shield 
will open the door to an entire global system 
of shields that would undermine its nuclear 
capabilities. U.S. officials insist, at least 
publicly, that they have no plans for a global 
missile defense system. The most recent U.S. 
National Security Strategy explicitly states 
that the missile shield is designed to protect 
its European allies from a nuclear threat 
from rogue states, specifically Iran and 
North Korea.11 
Putin is not buying this claim. The 
Kremlin believes that Russia, not Iran, is 
the target of this shield because Iran does 
not have nuclear missile capabilities—a 
point substantiated by the recent National 
Intelligence Estimate.12 As Putin remarked, 
“We are being told the anti-missile defense 
system is targeted against something that 
does not exist. Doesn't it seem funny to 
you?"13 
The U.S. intelligence community is 
not laughing; it believes Iran’s ballistic mis-
sile inventory is among the largest in the 
Middle East. Iran possesses several hundred 
foreign short range Scud-B and Scud-C mis-
siles, as well as their own Zelzal, Samid, and 
Fateh missiles. The centerpiece of their bal-
listic missile effort is the Shahab-3, which 
supposedly has a range of 1200m, placing 
Israel and southeastern Europe easily 
within reach.  It is also rumored that Iran 
possess the Shahab-5 (2,500 mile range), and 
an ICBM dubbed Kowsar.14 
 If Iran were to fire these missiles, 
and we are to believe Iranian Presidents 
Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, Israel would 
be a more likely target than Europe. A mis-
sile shield in Poland, though, would not pro-
tect Israel. Since Iran is much closer to Is-
rael than Poland the interceptor missile 
would never reach Iran’s missile in time. 
The proposed shield would not even protect 
fellow NATO member Turkey.  
It is also unclear how a European 
Missile Shield would protect America’s allies 
from North Korean missiles. North Korea 
has become markedly less menacing in re-
cent months since Pyongyang promised to 
dismantle the country’s nuclear program. 
North Korea may not possess nuclear weap-
ons but it does possess short-range missiles, 
which it demonstrated by firing a Taepo-
dong-1 over Japan’s bow in 1998. 
 It is also widely believed that North 
Korea possesses a long-range Taepodong-2 
that is capable of reaching the United 
States. This would be less worrisome if Kim 
Jong-Il had not threatened a “relentless, an-
nihilating strike” in response to any U.S. 
preemptive strike against his missiles, 
which he conveniently likes to test without 
diverging the flight trajectory or landing 
zone.15 Still, it is unclear how a missile 
shield in Europe protects the American con-
tinent, or America’s ally Japan, from a North 
Korean missile. 
  Furthermore, if a rogue state wanted 
to detonate a weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD) in Europe, it would not likely choose 
to deliver this weapon via ballistic missiles, 
even if it had the capability. Sending a mis-
sile is the equivalent of sending a calling 
card. In this age of terrorism, missiles are 
not the weapon of choice because it is too 
easy to link the missile back to the offending 
agent(s). Car bombs, improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), airplanes, and rocket-
propelled grenades are the preferred weap-
ons. The missile defense shield would be use-
less against these types of attacks. 
 The United States’ dogged insistence 
on this European shield is troubling. Amer-
ica is spending billions of dollars per year on 
a system that may or may not work, to guard 
against a threat that likely does not exist. 
What is known for certain, though, is that 
this missile shield is provoking Russia at a 
time when the United States can ill afford 
another enemy.  
 Other actions can deter a rogue coun-
try from firing a missile at U.S. targets. Ulti-
mately, humanity, not technology, will act as 
the greatest deterrent against potential ene-
mies. As former Assistant Secretary of De-
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fense Philip Coyle remarked, “Dollar for dol-
lar, [our diplomats] are the most cost-
effective missile defense system the United 
States ever had.”16 Americans should take 
comfort because this approach has worked 
before. After all, diplomacy, not a preventa-
tive military strike, brought the Cuban mis-
sile crisis to an end. Likewise, the Cold War 
was not won solely through arms races, mili-
tary displays of force and proxy wars. Diplo-
macy was equally as important in achieving 
victory.  
 Russia, more than ever, is an impor-
tant ally for the United States. The United 
States needs Russia to stay within the fold 
and not facilitate Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It 
also needs Russia’s help in the War on Ter-
ror, especially as the North Caucasus and 
Central Asia have become more radicalized. 
The United States should look for ways to 
engage Russia, not enrage it. 
Unfortunately, this is what the Euro-
pean missile shield, a costly program of mar-
ginal necessity and marginal operational 
ability, is doing. America should abandon 
this pursuit as a sign of good faith towards 
the Russian Federation. Currently, there is 
no need for such a shield and, ironically, 
building the shield may actually necessitate 
the need for one, a classic example of the se-
curity dilemma. This is a point too many pol-
icy makers and politicians have overlooked. 
Rudy Giuliani, for one, recently remarked, 
“The best answer to Putin would be a sub-
stantial increase in the size of our mili-
tary."17 
A military buildup is the wrong ap-
proach. It was precisely this military one-
ups-manship that fueled the Cold War in the 
first place. And despite what Bush and Putin 
may believe, the Cold War is over—the 
United States won, it does not need to fight 
it again. Abandoning the European Missile 
Shield is one way to prevent the return of 
another Cold War. American children al-
ready have to remove their shoes at the air-
port; should they really have to practice the 
duck-and-cover under their desks again? 
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